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A quarter of a century ago, philosopher Judith Butler (1990) called upon society to create 23 
“gender trouble” by disrupting the binary view of sex, gender, and sexuality. She argued that 24 
gender, rather than being an essential quality following from biological sex, or an inherent 25 
identity, is an act which grows out of, reinforces, and is reinforced by, societal norms and 26 
creates the illusion of binary sex. Despite the fact that Butler’s philosophical approach to 27 
understanding gender has many resonances with a large body of gender research being 28 
conducted by social psychologists, little theorizing and research within experimental social 29 
psychology has drawn directly on Butler’s ideas. In this paper, we will discuss how Butler’s 30 
ideas can add to experimental social psychologists’ understanding of gender. We describe the 31 
Butler’s ideas from Gender Trouble and discuss the ways in which they fit with current 32 
conceptualizations of gender in experimental social psychology. We then propose a series of 33 
new research questions that arise from this integration of Butler’s work and the social 34 
psychological literature. Finally, we suggest a number of concrete ways in which 35 
experimental social psychologists can incorporate notions of gender performativity and 36 
gender trouble into the ways in which they research gender. 37 
 38 
  39 
  40 
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Gender Trouble in Social Psychology: How Can Butler’s Work Inform Experimental Social 41 
Psychologists’ Conceptualization of Gender? 42 
 43 
“We're born naked, and the rest is drag.” (RuPaul, 1996) 44 
 45 
A quarter of a century ago, philosopher Judith Butler (1990) called upon society to 46 
create “gender trouble” by disrupting the binary view of sex, gender, and sexuality. Key to 47 
her argument is that gender is not an essential, biologically determined quality or an inherent 48 
identity, but is repeatedly performed, based on, and reinforced by, societal norms. This 49 
repeated performance of gender is also performative, that is, it creates the idea of gender 50 
itself, as well as the illusion of two natural, essential sexes. In other words, rather than being 51 
women or men, individuals act as women and men, thereby creating the categories of women 52 
and men. Moreover, they face clear negative consequences if they fail to do their gender 53 
right. 54 
We argue that Butler’s philosophical approach to understanding gender has many 55 
resonances with, and implications for, a large body of gender research being conducted by 56 
social psychologists. Indeed, Butler’s notion of performativity echoes a range of social 57 
psychological approaches to gender and gender difference. What we social psychologists 58 
might call gender norms and stereotypes (e.g., Eagly, 1987; Fiske & Stevens, 1993), or 59 
gender schemas (Bem, 1981) provide the “scripts” for what Butler’s describes as the 60 
performance of gender.  61 
We are not the first to point out the relevance of Butler’s work to social psychology. 62 
Bem, drawing on Butler’s work, argued in 1995 that as gender researchers we should create 63 
gender trouble by making genders that fall outside of the binary visible, in order to disrupt 64 
binary, heteronormative views of gender within and outside of psychology. Minton (1997) 65 
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argued that queer theory more broadly, which challenges the binary, heteronormative system 66 
of sex and gender, should inform psychological theory and practice. Similarly, Hegarty 67 
(1997) uses Butler’s arguments regarding performativity to criticize neuro-psychological 68 
research that essentializes sexual orientation, pointing out the ways in which it ignores 69 
historical and cultural variation in sexuality and excludes women and other minorities. 70 
However, despite these calls for gender trouble over 20 years ago, we believe that social 71 
psychology, and experimental social psychology in particular, has yet to truly step up and 72 
answer the call. 73 
Despite past acknowledgements of the importance of Butler’s work by social 74 
psychologists, in particular by qualitative psychologist, to our knowledge, little theorizing 75 
and research within experimental (and quantitative) social psychology has directly drawn on 76 
Butler’s ideas. This is despite the fact that there are identifiable similarities in broad 77 
theoretical ideas espoused by many social psychologists with an interest in gender and 78 
Butler’s ideas. Thus, we argue that there is great value in (again) promoting the ideas Butler 79 
puts forward in Gender Trouble to social psychologists. While experimental social 80 
psychological perspectives on gender have been concerned primarily with the origin and 81 
perpetuation of gender stereotypes, Butler’s work is more political in her explicit call to 82 
create gender trouble. The political nature of the work is perhaps one reason why 83 
experimental social psychologists have been reluctant to build on and integrate Butler’s ideas 84 
in their work– but, we would argue, it is indeed one of the reasons they should. Combining 85 
these two perspectives seems potentially fruitful, bringing together Butler’s theorizing and 86 
her call for social and political change with established experimental social psychological 87 
theory and empirically testable hypotheses.  88 
In this paper we will first describe Butler’s work in more detail. We will then discuss 89 
the extent to which her work fits with different conceptualizations of gender in the social 90 
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psychological literature, with a focus on experimental social psychology. We will then 91 
propose new avenues of research that could potentially grow out of an integration of Butler’s 92 
work into social psychology. Finally, we will discuss the different ways in which Butler’s 93 
work can inform and challenge the ways in which we, as experimental social psychologists, 94 
study and operationalize gender. 95 
Butler’s View on Gender 96 
In her book Gender Trouble (1990) Butler argues that within Western culture, sex, 97 
gender, and sexual orientation are viewed as closely linked, essential qualities. The prevalent 98 
view is that biological sex is binary (male vs. female), essential, and natural, and that it forms 99 
the basis for binary gender, which is viewed as the cultural interpretation of sex, and sexual 100 
desire. In other words, there is a belief that a baby born with a penis will grow up to identify 101 
and act as a man - whatever that means in a specific culture - and, as part of this gender role, 102 
be sexually attracted to women. Similarly, there is a belief that a baby born with a vagina will 103 
grow up to identify and act as a woman and, as part of this gender role, be sexually attracted 104 
to men. Butler argues that these configurations of sex, gender, and sexual desire are the only 105 
“intelligible” genders in our culture. 106 
This societal view of gender is also reflected in the works of many feminist writers, 107 
who define sex as biological and gender as cultural (see Gould, 1977, for a review and critical 108 
discussion). Butler criticizes this distinction between sex –  as natural, essential, and pre-109 
discursive (i.e., existing before culture and before interpretation) –  and gender as its cultural 110 
interpretation. She argues that it is not just gender that is culturally constructed and has 111 
prescriptive and proscriptive qualities, but that this also applies to sex as a binary category. 112 
Through this, Butler (1990) argues that the distinction between sex and gender is 113 
meaningless, noting that “perhaps this construct called ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as 114 
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gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender with the consequence that the 115 
distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all” (p. 9). 116 
Butler cites evidence for the considerable variability in chromosomes, genitalia, and 117 
hormones, that don’t always align in the expected, binary manner. Indeed, even biologists, 118 
who traditionally view the body as natural and pre-discursive, increasingly argue that a binary 119 
view of human sex is overly simplistic and that sex should be viewed as a spectrum rather 120 
than a dichotomy, in terms of anatomical, hormonal, and even cellular sex (see Ainsworth, 121 
2015; Fausto-Sterling, 2000; see also Fausto-Sterling, 1993). This variability can include 122 
ambiguous genitalia, a “mismatch” between chromosomes and genitalia, or a body that is 123 
comprised of a mix of “male” (XY) and “female” (XX) cells1. Some research suggest that up 124 
to 10% of children are born with sex characteristics that do not clearly fall into the category 125 
of female or male (e.g., Arboleda, Sandberg, & Vilain, 2014), although these numbers are 126 
debated and some argue the number is much lower. For example, Sax (2002) argues that only 127 
very specific “conditions” should qualify as intersex and that only about 0.018% of people 128 
should be considered intersex. We would argue, however, that exact numbers or specific 129 
definitions of what constitutes “intersex” are irrelevant here and that debates about exact 130 
numbers are indeed illustrative of the very process Butler discusses – that there is no 131 
“objective” or natural sex, but that it is performatively constructed. 132 
Regardless of exact numbers, Butler argues that any individual who does not fall 133 
clearly into one of the two sex categories is labeled as abnormal and pathological (see Sax’s 134 
usage of the term “condition”), and steps are taken to “rectify” this abnormality. For example, 135 
the majority of babies born with intersex characteristics undergo surgery and are raised as 136 
                                                          
1 Please note that these terms are based on the common view of naturally binary sex under which most 
researchers operate. We do not mean to imply that Butler herself would use these terms or, indeed, would be 
convinced by the idea that these bodies – or any bodies – exist “naturally” prior to interpretation. 
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either male or female (Human Rights Watch, 2017), protecting and maintaining the binary 137 
construction of sex.  138 
To be clear, Butler does not argue that biological processes do not exist or do not 139 
affect differences in hormones or anatomy. Rather, she argues that bodies do not exist outside 140 
of cultural interpretation and that this interpretation results in over-simplified, binary views of 141 
sex. In other words, biological processes do not themselves result in two “natural”, distinct, 142 
and meaningful, categories of people. The two sexes only appear natural, obvious, and 143 
important to us because of the gendered world in which we live. More specifically, the 144 
repeated performance of two polar, opposite genders makes the existence of two natural, 145 
inherent, pre-discursive sexes seem plausible. In other words, Butler views gender as a 146 
performance in which we repeatedly engage and which creates the illusion of binary sex. She 147 
argues: 148 
“Because there is neither an "essence" that gender expresses or externalizes 149 
nor an objective ideal to which gender aspires; because gender is not a fact, 150 
the various acts of gender create the idea of gender, and without those acts, 151 
there would be no gender at all. Gender is, thus, a construction that regularly 152 
conceals its genesis. The tacit collective agreement to perform, produce, and 153 
sustain discrete and polar genders as cultural fictions is obscured by the 154 
credibility of its own production. The authors of gender become entranced by 155 
their own fictions whereby the construction compels one's belief in its 156 
necessity and naturalness.” (p. 522) 157 
Thus, for Butler, gender is neither essential nor biologically determined, but rather it 158 
is created by its own performance and hence it is performative. The term performativity, 159 
originating in Austin’s (1962) work on performative utterances, refers to speech acts or 160 
behaviors which create the very thing they describe. For example, the sentence “I now 161 
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pronounce you man and wife” not only describes what the person is doing (i.e., pronouncing 162 
something) but also creates the marriage (i.e., the thing it is pronouncing) through the 163 
pronouncement. Butler builds on this work by exploring how gender works in a similar way – 164 
gender is created by its own performance. 165 
However, as this binary performance of gender is almost ubiquitous, its performative 166 
nature is concealed. The binary performance of gender is further reinforced by the reactions 167 
of others to those who fail to adhere to gender norms. Butler argues that “Discrete genders 168 
are part of what ‘humanizes’ individuals within contemporary culture; indeed, those who fail 169 
to do their gender right are regularly punished” (p. 522). This punishment includes the 170 
oppression of women and the stigmatization and marginalization of those who violate the 171 
gender binary, either by disrupting the presumed link between sex and gender (e.g., 172 
transgender individuals) or between sex and sexuality (e.g., lesbian and gay individuals) or by 173 
challenging the binary system in itself (e.g., intersex, bisexual, or genderqueer individuals). 174 
This stigma is clearly evidenced by the high rate of violence against transgender women, 175 
particularly those of color (Adams, 2017); surgeries performed on intersex babies to achieve 176 
“normal” sex characteristics (Human Rights Watch, 2017); and the stigmatization of sexual 177 
minorities (Lick, Durso, & Johnson, 2013).  178 
These negative reactions and the binary performance of gender, Butler argues, do not 179 
exist by chance. Instead, they serve as tools of a system of power structures which is trying to 180 
reproduce and sustain itself – namely a patriarchal system of compulsory heterosexuality in 181 
which women serve as a means of reproduction to men, as their mothers and wives. These 182 
power structures are both prohibitive (i.e., proscriptive), repressing deviating gender 183 
performance, as well as generative (i.e., prescriptive), creating binary, heteronormative 184 
gender performance.  185 
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Butler’s work is a call to action to overthrow these structures and end the problematic 186 
practices that they engender. However, she criticizes feminist voices who emphasize a shared 187 
identity (“women”) to motivate collective action on behalf of the group in order to achieve 188 
societal changes. By arguing that gender is not something one is, but rather something one 189 
does or performs, Butler argues that gender identity is not based on some inner truth, but 190 
instead a by-product of repeated gender performance. Framing gender identity as an inherent 191 
part of the self, as many feminist writers did at the time (and indeed still do), she argues, 192 
reinforces the gender binary and in turn plays into the hands of the patriarchy and compulsory 193 
heterosexuality. Feminists should instead seek to understand how the category of “women” is 194 
produced and restrained by the means through which social change is sought (such as 195 
language or the political system). 196 
This argument has particular relevance to the notion of gender identity. As such, it has 197 
been criticized as invalidating transgender individuals, whose experience of a true inner 198 
gender identity that is not in line with the sex they were assigned at birth is often questioned. 199 
This is despite the fact that from a young age transgender individuals view themselves in 200 
terms of their expressed gender, both explicitly and implicitly, mirroring self-views of cis-201 
gender2 children (Olson, Key, & Eaton, 2015). Butler has responded to these criticisms 202 
repeatedly. For example, answering a question about what is most often misunderstood about 203 
her theory in an interview in 2015, she replies:  204 
“I do know that some people believe that I see gender as a “choice” rather than 205 
as an essential and firmly fixed sense of self.  My view is actually not that.   206 
No matter whether one feels one’s gendered and sexed reality to be firmly 207 
fixed or less so, every person should have the right to determine the legal and 208 
linguistic terms of their embodied lives.  So whether one wants to be free to 209 
                                                          
2 “Cis” refers to individuals for whom the sex they are assigned at birth and their gender identity align. 
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live out a “hard-wired” sense of sex or a more fluid sense of gender, is less 210 
important than the right to be free to live it out, without discrimination, 211 
harassment, injury, pathologization or criminalization – and with full 212 
institutional and community support.” (The Conversation Project, 2015) 213 
Thus, Butler does not question people’s sense of self, but instead criticizes a shared 214 
gender identity as the necessary basis for political action. She points out that abandoning the 215 
idea of gender as an identity does not take away the potential of agency on behalf of women. 216 
Instead, it opens up the possibility of agency, which other approaches that view identity as 217 
fixed and stable do not enable. The fact that identity is constructed means that it is neither 218 
completely arbitrary and free, nor completely determined, leaving room for re-structuring, 219 
subversion, and for disrupting the status quo. Thus, the common identity “we, women” is not 220 
necessary for collective action on behalf of the feminist movement, as anyone can engage in 221 
subversion and the disruption of the gender binary. Indeed, we would argue that feminism 222 
becomes more powerful as an inclusive movement for gender equality more broadly defined, 223 
not just equality between women and men.  224 
In conclusion, Butler argues that we, as a society, need to create gender trouble by 225 
disrupting the gender binary to dismantle the oppressive system of patriarchy and compulsory 226 
heterosexuality. While some of Butler’s ideas seem very different from how gender is 227 
generally viewed in the experimental social psychological literature, others resonate well with 228 
social psychological theorizing and empirical research. In the next section, we will discuss 229 
ways in which Butler’s view is compatible – and incompatible - with some of the most 230 




Is Butler’s View Compatible with Conceptualizations of Gender in Social Psychology? 233 
Gender has been an increasingly important focus within psychology more generally, 234 
and in social psychology in particular (e.g., Eagly, Eaton, Rose, Riger, & McHugh, 2012). 235 
While there is considerable variation in how psychologists view and treat gender, we argue 236 
that many of approaches fall into one of three traditions: (1) evolutionary approaches which 237 
view binary, biological sex as the determinant of gender and gender differences; (2) social 238 
structural approaches which view societal forces such as status and social roles as the 239 
determinant of gender stereotypes and, in turn, gender differences; and, not mutually 240 
exclusive from a social structural approach, (3) social identity approaches which view gender 241 
as one out of many social categories with which individuals identify to varying degrees. In 242 
addition, integrative approaches draw on more than one of these traditions, as well as 243 
developmental, social cognitive, and sociological models of gender, and integrate them to 244 
explain gendered behavior. While none of these approaches is entirely compatible with the 245 
argument that binary sex is constructed through the repeated binary performance of gender 246 
with gender identity as a by-product of this performance, there are great differences in the 247 
extent to which they are in line with, and can speak to, Butler’s ideas. 248 
Evolutionary psychology is, we would argue, the least compatible with Butler’s view 249 
on sex and gender. Evolutionary approaches to the psychology of gender maintain that gender 250 
differences are, for the most part, genetic – resulting from the different adaptive problems 251 
faced by women and men in their evolutionary past (see Byrd-Craven & Geary, 2013), 252 
particularly due to reproductive differences such as paternal uncertainty for men and higher 253 
parental investment for women. These differences, it is argued, then shaped our genes – and 254 
gender differences - through sexual selection (i.e., gender differences in the factors predicting 255 
successful reproduction; Darwin, 1871). These approaches can be described as essentializing 256 
gender, that is, promoting the belief that men and women share an important but 257 
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unobservable “essence”. Essentialism includes a range of factors such the degree to which 258 
individuals perceive social categories to be fixed and natural (Roberts, Ho, Rhodes, & 259 
Gelman, 2017) and has been shown to be associated with greater levels of stereotyping and 260 
prejudice (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004). Evidence further suggests 261 
people who hold highly essentialist beliefs of gender are more supportive of what the authors 262 
call “boundary-enhancing initiatives” such as gender-segregated classrooms and legislation 263 
forcing transgender individuals to use the bathroom associated with the sex they were 264 
assigned at birth (Roberts et al. 2017). Thereby, essentialism, and the resultant stereotypes 265 
and prejudice, contribute to the reinforcement of the status quo. 266 
Evolutionary psychology’s approach to gender exemplifies many points Butler (1990) 267 
criticizes in Gender Trouble. First, it treats sex as a pre-discursive binary fact rather than a 268 
cultural construct. In other words, it ignores variability in chromosomes, genitals, and 269 
hormones (Ainsworth, 2015; Fausto-Sterling, 1993) and views binary sex – and gender – as 270 
an inherent, essential quality. Moreover, evolutionary approaches argue that gender follows 271 
from sex and thus portray binary sex as an explanation for, rather than a result of, gender 272 
differences (i.e., gender performance). In addition to ignoring the existence of intersex 273 
individuals, these approaches also often ignore homosexuality, focusing exclusively on 274 
heterosexual desires and reproduction. Thus, we would argue, such evolutionary approaches 275 
play into the patriarchal system of compulsory heterosexuality in which women function 276 
primarily as mothers and wives.  277 
Social structural approaches to gender such as early conceptions of social role theory 278 
(Eagly, 1987) and the stereotype content model (Fiske & Stevens, 1993) are more compatible 279 
with Butler’s views. Such approaches argue that societal structures such as social roles and 280 
differences in power and status determine gender stereotypes, which affect both gendered 281 
behavior as well as reactions to those who deviate from gender stereotypes. In other words, 282 
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gender stereotypes provide the “script” for the performance of gender with negative 283 
consequences for those who fail to ‘learn their lines’ or ‘stick to the script’.  284 
The social psychological literature provides many empirical examples of these 285 
negative consequences. For example, Rudman and colleagues describe how those who 286 
deviate from their scripts often encounter backlash in the form of economic and social 287 
penalties (for a review see Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Glick, & Phelan, 2012). This backlash 288 
discourages individuals from engaging in stereotype-incongruent behavior as they avoid 289 
negative consequences in the future, reducing their potential to act as deviating role models 290 
for others. Moreover, witnessing the backlash gender troublemakers encounter may also 291 
vicariously discourages others from breaking gender stereotypes to avoid negative 292 
consequences for themselves. The literature on precarious manhood further suggests that 293 
these issues might be particularly pronounced for men (Bosson, Vandello & Caswell, 2013). 294 
Research demonstrates that men must continuously prove their masculinity by avoiding 295 
anything deemed feminine to avoid negative consequences such as loss of status. Each of 296 
these lines of research are very much in line with Butler’s arguments, both with the idea that 297 
those who “fail to do their gender right” are punished and with the idea that the gender binary 298 
is a tool to uphold the patriarchy.  299 
However, in other respects, social structural approaches are less compatible with 300 
Butler’s arguments. First, they tend not to take non-binary gender into account, and the 301 
empirical research tends to operationalize men and women as disjunct categories. Although 302 
research focusing on how intra-gender variability is often much larger than between gender 303 
variability (e.g. Hyde, 2005) is a good first step, it still ultimately relies on dividing people 304 
into the binary categories of female and male. Moreover, these approaches also rarely take 305 
issues of intersectionality into account (see Shields, 2008) and focus on stereotypes of white, 306 
14 
 
heterosexual, middle-class, cis women and men, although there are some notable exceptions 307 
(e.g., Brambilla, Carnaghi, & Ravenna, 2011; Fingerhut & Peplau, 2006). 308 
Approaches from the social identity and self-categorization tradition (Tajfel & Turner, 309 
1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherall, 1987) view gender as a social identity 310 
(e.g., Skevington & Baker, 1989). This tradition argues that in addition to one’s personal 311 
identity, different social groups are integrated into the self-concept, forming social identities. 312 
These social identities can be based on meaningful social categories such as gender or 313 
occupation, but also in response to random allocation to seemingly meaningless groups. The 314 
strength of the identification with one’s gender as well the salience of this identity in any 315 
given context determine the extent to which the self-concept is affected by gender stereotypes 316 
– and in turn the extent to which gendered patterns of behavior are displayed (e.g., Cadinu & 317 
Galdi, 2012; Lorenzi‐Cioldi, 1991; Ryan & David, 2003; Ryan, David, & Reynolds, 2004). 318 
While the idea of gender as an identity – rather than a result of gendered behavior – 319 
may be seen as being inconsistent with Butler’s argument, results from minimal group studies 320 
(e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, Flament, 1971) are very much in line with her reasoning. These 321 
studies demonstrate that identities can form on the basis of completely irrelevant, artificial 322 
categories and are thus by no means inherent nor inevitable. Thus, while in our given society, 323 
these identities are considered to be largely binary, this is not inevitable and likely the result 324 
of social forces. Moreover, the evidence from a social identity perspective that supports the 325 
notion that changes in context can affect gender salience, levels of identification, and thus the 326 
extent of gendered behaviors, are also very much in line with Butler’s arguments. 327 
Lastly, integrative approaches draw on more than one of these traditions as well as 328 
developmental, social cognitive, and sociological models of gender. For example, social role 329 
theory has developed over time, integrating biological as well as social identity aspects into 330 
its framework, resulting in a biosocial approach (Eagly & Wood, 2012). More specifically, 331 
15 
 
more recent versions of the theory argue that the division of labor leads to gendered behavior 332 
via three different mechanisms: (1) social regulation (as described above), (2) identity-based 333 
regulation, similar to the processes outlined by social identity theory, and (3) biological 334 
regulation through hormonal processes such as changes in testosterone and oxytocin. 335 
Importantly, these processes interact with one another, that is, hormonal responses are 336 
dependent on expectations from others and gender identity. While the social regulation of 337 
gender is very much in line with Butler’s arguments, the integration of biological – and 338 
particularly evolutionary – perspectives fits less with her idea that gender performance is 339 
what creates gender. 340 
Another influential integrative approach is the interactive model of gender-related 341 
behavior (Deaux & Major, 1987). Rather than focusing on distal factors which affect gender 342 
stereotypes, this model focuses on the situational and contextual factors which result in 343 
gendered behavior. The model assumes that the performance of gender primarily takes place 344 
in social interactions and serves specific social purposes. Gendered behavior thus emerges 345 
based on the expectations held by the perceiver, such as stereotypes, schemata, and 346 
knowledge about the specific target; the target themselves (e.g., their self-schema, their desire 347 
to confirm or disprove the perceiver’s expectations), and the situation. For example, large 348 
gender differences in behavior are likely to emerge when the perceiver believes men and 349 
women are very different and thus expects stereotypical behavior, changing the way they 350 
treat and communicate with male and female targets; when male and female targets hold very 351 
gendered self-schemata and are motivated to confirm the perceiver’s expectations; and when 352 
the situation makes stereotypes salient and allows for different behaviors to emerge. 353 
This model is perhaps the most in line with Butler’s perspectives on gender. Similar 354 
to Butler, it focuses on the doing of gender, that is, on gendered behavior and its emergence 355 
in social interactions. Moreover, the model takes a more social cognitive approach, referring 356 
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to gendered self-schemata rather than gender identities. Thus, while retaining the context 357 
dependence of gendered behavior inherent in social identity approaches, this model does not 358 
necessarily presume gender as a social identity in terms of men and women. In contrast to all 359 
other models discussed above, this model allows for a less binary, more fluid understanding 360 
of gender. 361 
While these approaches thus vary considerably in how compatible they are with 362 
Butler’s argument, all of them treat gender as a given, pre-existing fact, which is in stark 363 
contrast to Butler’s core argument of gender being a performative act, coming into existence 364 
only through its own performance. The work of social psychologists operating outside of the 365 
experimental framework is more compatible in this regard. More specifically, discourse 366 
analysts argue that the self, including the gendered self, is created through language (e.g., 367 
Kurz & Donaghue, 2013) and focus on the production of gender in interactions rather than on 368 
gender as a predictor of behavior. For example, researchers conducting feminist conversation 369 
analysis have examined how patterns in the delivery of naturally occurring speech reproduce 370 
heteronormative gender (e.g., Kitzinger, 2005) and research from the ethnomethodology-371 
discursive tradition examines how people acquire a gendered character through speech (e.g., 372 
Wetherell & Edley, 1999).  373 
Future Research Directions 374 
In the previous section, we have outlined how some of the issues raised by Butler, 375 
such as the negative reactions to those who fail to do their gender right, have already received 376 
considerable attention in the social psychological literature. Other aspects of her argument, 377 
however, have received very little attention and hold the potential for interesting future 378 
research. We identify two broad ways in which Butler’s work can inform and shape future 379 
social psychological research: (a) engendering new research questions which have not yet 380 
been investigated empirically, and (b) challenging our way of studying gender itself. 381 
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New Research Questions 382 
Butler’s work is purely theoretical and thus many of her ideas have not been tested 383 
empirically, particularly using an experimental approach. Perhaps the most central question 384 
that can be examined by social psychologists is whether creating “gender trouble” by 385 
subverting ideas about sex, gender, and sexual desire, can indeed lead to changes in binary 386 
views of sex and gender and the proscriptive and prescriptive stereotypes that come with 387 
these views. Based on predictions derived from social role theory (Eagly, 1987), we would 388 
indeed expect that a decrease in the performance of gender as binary (i.e., less gendered 389 
social roles) would lead to decreases in gender stereotyping and the reliance on gender as a 390 
social category. In other words, if genders are not tied to specific social roles (or vice versa), 391 
they lose their ability to be informative, both in terms of self-relevant information (“what 392 
should I be like?”) and in terms of expectations of others (“what is this person like?”).  393 
On the other hand, as gender identity is very central to the self-image of many people 394 
(Ryan et al., 2003), challenging ideas about gender may be perceived as threatening. Social 395 
identity theory and self-categorization theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987) 396 
argue that members of groups – including men and women - have a need to see their own 397 
group as distinct from the outgroup. If this distinctiveness is threatened, highly identified men 398 
and women are likely to enhance the contrast between their ingroup and the outgroup, for 399 
example by presenting themselves in a more gender stereotypical way and applying 400 
stereotypes to the other group (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) or by 401 
constructing gender differences as essential and biological (Falomir-Pichastor & Hegarty, 402 
2014). These identity processes may thus reinforce a system of two distinct genders with 403 
opposing traits, and further punish and alienate those who fail to conform to gender norms 404 
and stereotypes. Future research needs to investigate the circumstances under which gender 405 
trouble can indeed lead to less binary views of gender, and the circumstances under which it 406 
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does not. This needs to include identifying the psychological mechanisms and barriers 407 
involved in such change.  408 
Importantly, this investigation should go beyond examining reactions to women and 409 
men who behave in counter-stereotypical ways, such as women in leadership positions or 410 
stay-at-home fathers, and include a focus on more radical challenges to the gender binary 411 
such as non-binary and trans individuals or drag performers. Butler discusses drag as an 412 
example of gender trouble in detail, quoting the anthropologist Newton (1968) in her 413 
observations of how drag subverts notions of gender. Discussing “layers” of appearance, 414 
Newton remarks that on the one hand, the outside appearance of drag queens is feminine, but 415 
the inside (i.e., the body) is male. At the same time, however, it appears that the outside 416 
appearance (i.e. body) is male, but the inside (the “essence”) is feminine, making it hard to 417 
uphold consistent, essentialist ideas about sex and gender. Butler further argues that the 418 
exaggeration of femininity (in the case of drag queens) and masculinity (in the case of drag 419 
kings) in drag performances highlights the performative nature of gendered behaviors, that is, 420 
how gender is created through gendered performance. On the other hand, we would argue 421 
that because drag performances often draw heavily on gender stereotypes, they may also 422 
reinforce the idea of what it means to be a man or a woman. To our knowledge, there is no 423 
psychological research on how drag affects perceptions of gender, but as drag becomes more 424 
and more accessible to a wider, and more mainstream, audience (e.g., due to popular TV 425 
shows such as RuPaul’s Drag Race) it might be an enlightening line of research to pursue. 426 
Does drag indeed highlight the performative nature of gender or does it simply reinforce 427 
stereotypes? Are reactions to appearance-based disruptions of the gender binary different to 428 
behavior-based ones such as reactions to assertive women or submissive men?  429 
Another potential line of research to pursue would be to build on the discursive 430 
literature by examining the performative nature of gender from an experimental social 431 
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psychological perspective, testing how gender is created through speech and behavior. 432 
Drawing on some of the findings from qualitative psychological research discussed in the 433 
previous section might be helpful in developing predictions and quantitatively testable 434 
hypotheses. 435 
Finally, if gender trouble is indeed effective in challenging binary, essentialist views 436 
of sex and gender, it is worth investigating how disruptive gender performance can be 437 
encouraged and used as a means of collective action. The literature on collective action to 438 
achieve gender equality has often drawn on (gender) identity-based ideas of mobilization 439 
(e.g., Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 2000; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995). As outlined above, Butler 440 
criticizes these approaches and argues that group-based identities (“we, women”) are not 441 
necessary to achieve change. How then can we inclusively mobilize others to engage in 442 
collective action without drawing on gender identities and inadvertently reinforcing the 443 
gender binary – and with it the patriarchal system of compulsory heterosexuality it supports?  444 
More recently, psychologists have argued that it might be more effective to focus on 445 
“feminist” (rather than gender) ideologies which acknowledge, rather than ignore, issues of 446 
intersectionality (see Radke, Hornsey, & Barlow, 2016), and to encourage men to engage in 447 
collective action to achieve gender equality (e.g., Subašić et al., in press). We agree with 448 
these arguments but further suggest that collective action research should examine how 449 
individuals of any gender can (a) be motivated to engage in collective action to achieve 450 
gender equality generally, and (b) be motivated to engage in gender trouble and disrupt 451 
binary notions of gender as a form of collective action.  452 
  453 
Studying Gender from a Performative Perspective 454 
In addition to new research question, Butler’s work also highlights the need for 455 
different methodological approaches to gender in experimental social psychology, and indeed 456 
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there is much that could be learnt from those that work in the discursive tradition. There is 457 
also the potential for gender researchers to engage in gender trouble themselves by changing 458 
the way in which they treat gender.  459 
For the most part, experimental psychologists have tended to examine gender as a 460 
predictor or independent variable – examining gender differences in all manner of social, 461 
cognitive, and clinical measures (e.g., Hyde, 2005; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). Indeed, as 462 
researchers, we (the authors) are guilty of publishing many papers using this methodology 463 
(e.g., Morgenroth, Fine, Ryan & Genat, 2017; Haslam & Ryan, 2008). Similar to 464 
performative speech acts, we would argue that this can be seen as a performative research 465 
practice. The way in which we conduct our research and the choices we make in relation to 466 
gender creating the very construct that is studied, namely gender and gender differences. Our 467 
assumptions of gender as binary, pre-discursive, and natural produces research that focuses 468 
on binary, categorical gender as a predictor of gendered attitudes and behavior.  469 
However, to our knowledge, there is very little quantitative or experimental research, 470 
that looks at the psychological processes implicated in the performance of gender, that is, 471 
treating gender as an outcome or dependent variable. If experimental social psychologists are 472 
to contribute to gender trouble, we should shift our views away from sex and gender as 473 
causes for behavior and psychological outcomes (i.e., as an independent or predictor 474 
variables). Instead, we should treat gender – whether measured as an identity, in terms of 475 
self-stereotyping, as simple self-categorization - as a result of societal and psychological 476 
forces. Rather than asking what sex and gender can explain, we need to look at what explains 477 
sex and gender.  478 
Moreover, while the literature acknowledges that gender salience and gender self-479 
stereotyping vary depending on context (e.g., Lorenzi‐Cioldi, 1991; Ryan & David, 2003), 480 
gender itself, regardless of how it is measured, is measured as a stable, and discrete construct. 481 
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One is a man or a woman and remains so over the course of one’s life. If, however, we view 482 
gender as a performance, then we must also view gender as an act, a behavior, which changes 483 
depending on context and audience. Asking participants to tick a box to indicate one’s gender 484 
– as many of us often do in our research practices - is an overly simplistic measure and 485 
cannot capture the nuances of doing gender. It is neither informative nor, we would argue, 486 
terribly interesting. Instead, one could measure gender identity salience and importance or 487 
gender performance – for example measuring gender stereotypical behavior or other types of 488 
gendered self-stereotyping (e.g., using measures similar to the Bem Sex-Role Inventory; 489 
Bem, 1974). 490 
Similarly, we, as researchers, need to stop treating gender as a binary variable. This 491 
includes our research practices as well as our theory development and research 492 
communications. For example, the demographic sections of most questionnaires should not 493 
restrict gender to two options. Instead, they should either provide a range of different options 494 
(e.g. non-binary, genderqueer, genderfluid, agender) or allow open responses. We would also 495 
suggest not using the option “other” in addition to “male” and “female” as it can be perceived 496 
as stigmatizing. Similarly, if asking about sex rather than gender, at least a third option (i.e. 497 
intersex) should be provided (see Fonesca, 2017, for examples). 498 
 However, we need to go beyond that. At the moment, even when gender is measured 499 
in a non-binary way, those who fall outside of the gender binary are usually excluded from 500 
analysis. This is equally true for sexual minorities. Unless sexual orientation is central to the 501 
research question, those who don’t identify as heterosexual are often excluded by gender 502 
researchers as stereotypes and norms of gay, lesbian, bisexual, or asexual individuals often 503 
differ from general gender stereotypes. While these decisions often make sense for each 504 
individual case (and we, the authors, have in fact engaged in them as well), this overall 505 
produces a picture that erases variation and reinforces the idea that there are two opposing 506 
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genders with clear boundaries. As experimental social psychologists with an interest in 507 
gender, we need to do better. Similarly, our theories themselves should allow for a fluid 508 
understanding of gender which also takes issues of intersectionality – with sexual orientation, 509 
but also with race, class, and other social categories - into account. 510 
Finally, when we talk about gender, we should do so in a way that makes gender 511 
diversity visible rather than way that marginalizes non-binary gender further. For example, 512 
replacing binary phrases such as “he or she” with gender-neutral ones such as “they” or ones 513 
that highlight non-binary gender such as “he, she, or they” or “he, she, or ze”3. While the use 514 
of the gender-neutral singular “they” is often frowned upon and deemed grammatically 515 
incorrect (American Psychological Association, 2010; University of Chicago, 2010), it has in 516 
fact been part of the English language for centuries and was widespread before being 517 
proscribed by grammarians advocating for the use of the generic masculine in the 19th 518 
century (Bodine, 1975). Despite these efforts, the singular “they” has remained part of spoken 519 
language, where it is used to refer to individuals whose sex is unknown or unspecified 520 
(“Somebody left their unicorn in my stable”) and to members of mixed-gender groups (e.g. 521 
“Anybody would feed their unicorn glitter if they could”).  522 
The use of new pronouns such as “ze”, specifically developed to refer to people 523 
outside of the binary, might be more effortful and equally controversial. However, evidence 524 
from Sweden, where the gender-neutral pronoun “hen” has become more widely used since 525 
the publication a children’s book using only “hen” instead of “han” (he) and “hon” (her) in 526 
2012, indicates that attitudes towards its use have shifted dramatically from predominantly 527 
negative to predominantly positive in a very short amount of time (Gustafsson-Sendén, Bäck, 528 
& Lindqvist, 2015). As gender researchers, we should be at the forefront of such issues and 529 
                                                          
3 The exact origins of the non-binary pronouns ze/hir or ze/zir are unknown, but ze/hir is often credited to 
Bornstein (1996). There are no clear conventions around non-binary pronoun use and many different 
alternatives have been proposed. 
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promote and advance gender equality – and gender diversity – not only through our research 530 
but also by communicating our research in a gender-inclusive way, especially in light of 531 
Butler’s (and others’) arguments that language is a crucial mechanism in creating gender and 532 
reinforcing the gender binary. 533 
Conclusion 534 
In this paper we put forward suggestions for ways in which Judith’s Butler’s (1990) 535 
notions of gender trouble could be integrated into experimental social psychology’s 536 
understanding of gender, gender difference, and gender inequality. We have outlined her 537 
work and discussed the extent to which prominent views of gender within psychology are 538 
compatible with this work. Moreover, we suggested potential avenues of future research and 539 
changes in the way that we, as researchers, treat gender.  540 
We believe that, as experimental social psychologists, we should be aware that we 541 
may inadvertently and performatively reinforce the gender binary in the way in which we do 542 
research – in the theories we develop, in the measures that we use, and in the research 543 
practices we undertake. By taking on board Butler’s ideas into social psychology, we can 544 
broaden our research agenda – raising and answering questions of how social change can be 545 
achieved. We can provide a greater understanding of the psychological processes involved in 546 
creating gender trouble, and in resisting gender trouble – but above all, we are in a position to 547 
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